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Introduction.
Throughout changing economic conditions and business cycles, managerial quality is maintained by the intervention of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.
Supervision by the board of directors, intervention by large shareholders, discipline from debt markets, competitive pressure from product markets control managerial behaviour. In some cases, when insufficient monitoring or managerial entrenchment has insulated management and when corporate performance has declined, markets react favourably to the CEO departures. In this study we investigate whether forced CEO dismissal triggers positive abnormal returns in listed French companies. Voluntary CEO departures or unexpected deaths of CEOs may entail a loss of human capital to the firm. Hence, we also analyse whether negative abnormal returns can expected in these cases. However, these market reactions may be dimmed or intensified depending on the qualities of the CEO's successor and corporate characteristics. For example, following poor performance, an external CEO may be hailed more favourably by the market in contrast to an internal successor who may be identified with past corporate underperformance.
This study does not only does with price reactions after the a change in top management, but also investigates whether or not specific corporate governance mechanisms are involved in bringing about CEO departures. Therefore, we investigate the role of holding companies (the dominating large shareholders), industrial companies, families, institutions and the government in exerting corporate control. This study contributes to the corporate governance literature as, so far, hardly any empirical research was performed for French companies. In the remainder of this section we formulate the propositions and embed them in the literature. Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory highlighted that managers may seek maximisation of their own utility curve at the detriment of corporate value. Remuneration contracts may reduce conflicts of interest if performance-related contracts can focus managers' attention on the corporate value drivers. However, in contrast to Anglo-American countries, remuneration contracts on the basis of pay-for-performance are not yet as widespread in Continental Europe. Hence, as performance related contracts are rare, bad corporate performance, resulting from the non-alignment of managerial objectives and corporate goals or from low adaptability of managerial skills to a changing economic climate, often leaves the shareholders no alternative but to substitute incumbent management. Forced managerial turnover is expected to lead to significant share price increases (proposition 1), even though the following costs have been incorporated: the search and hiring costs of new management (Walsh and Seward 1990) , the costs of breaking the contract with the fired manager (Knoeber 1986 ) and the loss of company-specific human capital.
Market reactions to forced managerial resignations.
The first event studies investigating the price impact of forced managerial turnover in the US (e.g. Furtado and Rozeff 1987) reveal a positive but not statistically significant price increase. Worell et al. (1993) confirm a price increase of 2.3% but their results are statistically significant at the 1% level provided that the managerial resignation announcement includes the nomination of a successor. 1 The degree of price reaction also depends on the presence of internal monitoring mechanisms in the study by Weisbach (1988) : there is no wealth impact if the managerial resignation takes place in a company of which the board is dominated by executive directors. However, top management substitution leads to a significantly positive price increase when the majority of the board consists of external independent directors. Denis and Denis (1995) study 69 forced resignations and find that the dismissal of underperforming management is greeted with relief by the market. There is a positive market reaction of 2.25% on the announcement day for companies which experienced a fall in performance over a three-year period prior to the managerial change.
However, the findings on forced managerial resignations are not unambiguous. Warner et al. (1988) uncover significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns of -4.3% subsequent to forced turnover (in the period of 5 to 30 days following the dismissal). This negative market reaction is explained by an information effect which masks the real impact of forced turnover on shareholder wealth: forced turnover may signal poor current and future performance which
had not yet been uncovered nor anticipated by the market. Mahajan and Lummer (1993) confirm a (weakly) significant negative cumulative abnormal return measured over a two day period (the day before and the day of the announcement) for US companies. Whereas the studies described above are about US companies, Pige (1994) does not discover any such relations for a small sample of French companies.
1 They find a 2.3% price increase (significant at the 1%-level) over the period [+1 day ;+30 days] if the announcement of the CEO departure (day 0) coincides with that of the nomination of a new CEO. The share price only increases by 2% (significance within the 10%-level) over the period [+1 day ;+30 days] if the departure and nomination announcements do not coincide. The fact that a resignation was expected by the market can be deduced from a price increase of 11% (significance of 5%) over a 30-day period prior to the CEO's resignation.
Market reactions to the death of the CEO.
Making abstraction of corporate performance, one would expect that the unanticipated death of the CEO would trigger a negative price reaction (proposition 2) since the company faces a loss in human capital which may have been company-specific. Johnson et al. (1985) do not detect any significant share price reaction around the announcement date, but discover increased volatility of abnormal returns subsequent to the announcement period. Worrell et al. (1993) reveal that the market reacts more negatively when the death of a CEO occurs suddenly compared to the cases in which the CEO dies after an illness, which provides some support for the informational efficiency of equity markets. Etebari et al. (1987) confirm the negative relation between CEO death and cumulative abnormal returns, but they find -after splitting the sample of deaths according to the cause of death (hearth attacks, accidents or suicides) -that accidents trigger significant positive market reactions of 8.25% over a 6 week window (symmetrically around the event day). This finding may result from the fact that
CEOs may be entrenched -perhaps due to a long tenure with positive track record or due to a substantial ownership stake -and are difficult to dismiss even in the wake of poor performance.
Market reactions to non-conflictual resignations and retirements by top managers.
As retirements at the normal retirement age can usually be well anticipated, there is no reason that the announcement of a retirement would cause a price reaction (proposition 3). On the other hand, a non-conflictual resignation prior to retirement age may create a negative price reaction if the company loses valuable company specific human capital (proposition 4). The wealth effects of non-conflictual resignations were investigated in French and US companies by Hubler and Schmidt (1996) and Mahajan and Lummer (1993) , respectively. Both studies reveal that the announcement of an executive director leaving the company on a nonconflictual basis coincides with a negative cumulative abnormal return (significant in the former, not significant in the latter). Still, the Mahajan and Lummer-study shows that there is a (significant) positive share price change when a CEO steps down but remains on the board as a director or when an executive director relinquishes his or her function but maintains a managerial role within the firm.
The findings on market reactions to age-related retirements are in line with the expectations: Furtado (1985) , Beatty an Zajac (1987) , Weisbach (1988) Mahajan and Lummer (1993) show that there are no price reactions. Exceptional are the results of Denis and Denis (1995) who uncover a small but positive significant abnormal return of 0.6%. Presumably, the market reacts with relief as, in the US, some directors stay on the board beyond the retirement age of 65.
The choice of a successor.
Most event studies test hypotheses based on the reasons why top management is substituted but do not consider the price impact related to the qualities of newly hired or promoted management. For example, the market may react differently depending on whether or not an internal candidate is nominated as CEO. Promoting internal candidates may hold two advantages: they may have (i) better company-specific process-and technological knowledge, clearer insights in products, markets and competition, and a closer relation with clients and (ii) social networks via which they acquire specific internal information. However, if a radical break with an existing strategy is essential, an external successor may be preferred as he may bring about change and revived creativity. The choice of a new CEO may also depend on corporate characteristics such as performance, corporate size and the degree of diversity of corporate activities. These characteristics may dim or amplify the price reactions to the different types of CEO departures described above. Persistent poor corporate performance leads to higher CEO dismissal as found by e.g. Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (1998) . As the CEO and his management team is responsible for poor performance, external succession -especially following forced turnover -is expected to trigger a positive market price reaction whereas internal promotion following poor performance may not be regarded favourably by the market (proposition 5a). In well performing companies, internal succession (after non-conflictual turnover) is less costly than external CEO succession. This implies that the expected negative price reaction after internal succession may be less substantial than after external succession (proposition 5b).
For large companies, it may be relatively less costly to nominate an internal successor than for small companies because large companies usually have a pool of potential successors.
Hence, in the absence of poor performance, internal succession (after non-conflictual turnover) may cause less strongly negative reactions in larger companies than in smaller ones (proposition 6a) (Furtado and Rozeff 1987) . If the need for new managerial skills is essential, external succession will cause a larger positive market reaction in smaller companies as it is easier to refocus the strategy of such firms (proposition 6b). The market reaction to a new top manager may also depend upon the industry in which a company operates. If the company is diversified and operates in several unrelated industries, the value of the human capital of a new top manager can be assessed with less precision than in undiversified companies. Hence, external succession may trigger a stronger price reaction 2 in a diversified company compared to undiversified firms (proposition 7), because a new external manager may bring about higher value added in diversified firms (Parrino 1997 ).
Corporate governance mechanisms.
As the CEO is ultimately responsible for the corporate performance, disciplinary actions are to be expected as a result of poor share price and accounting returns if an efficient corporate governance policy is exerted. Both the share price return and accounting performance portray a myopic view of the true value of managerial skills reflected by corporate performance. The relation between executive director or CEO resignations and share price performance may be weaker because share prices already incorporate market expectations regarding managerial replacement. On the other hand, accounting data can be manipulated (temporarily) by the choice of accounting policies (Teoh et al. 1998) . Therefore, the impact of both share price returns, and levels of and changes in operating and net accounting earnings on turnover are to be analysed.
A balanced board including both executives and non-executives reduces the agency costs and potential conflicts among decision makers and residual risk bearers. Non-executives are not only legally bound to monitor given their fiduciary duty, but they also often represent the large shareholders in an equity market with strong ownership concentration such as in France (Becht and Mayer 2000) . Furthermore, non-executives have incentives to develop a reputation as monitors as they face an external labour market which provides some form of disciplining for passive leadership. Separating the roles of CEO and non-executive chairman is also considered to be a strengthening factor of the board's monitoring ability since a nonexecutive chairman ensures more independence from management. Such recommendations have been included over the past few years into several 'codes of best practice' such as the Cadbury Report in 1992 in the UK, the Dutch Peters Committee code in 1996 and the Belgian Commission of Banking and Finance code in 1998 (Goergen and Renneboog 2001) . In contrast, French corporate law states that the chairman of the board of directors needs to assume the task of general management ('doit assumer la direction générale de la société'), 7 but also that two managing directors can help him in this task. In 83% of listed public limited corporations (sociétés anonymes, SA's), the functions of chairman of the board and of the CEO are combined by one person (Dherment 1996 (Banerjee et al. 1997) . Likewise, corporate shareholders may hold substantial share stakes in companies of a supplier or customer in order to influence and/or capitalise on their strategic decisions (Johnson et al. 2000) .
Financial institutions are often controlled by a holding company which also holds equity in the target firms. Consequently, the interests of a financial institution as a creditor and as an equity holder may diverge, such that in order to avoid conflicts of interest, this category of shareholder is not expected to actively monitor . Therefore, a positive relation is expected between turnover and the equity stake held by holding companies, industrial and commercial firms, individuals and families and no relation between turnover and institutional ownership concentration (proposition 8).
Contrary to Anglo-American countries, ownership structures in France are usually complex and pyramidal, and are constructed for reasons of control leverage (Wymeersch, 1994 Burkart et al. 1997 ).
When high leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy, close creditor monitoring may be expected. Thus, setting a high capital gearing amounts to the creation of a bonding mechanism for management (Aghion and Bolton 1992 ) and high turnover is expected to be positively related to high gearing (proposition 10). Denis and Denis (1993) show that creditor monitoring (measured by high leverage) combined with managerial ownership improves shareholder returns.
In the remainder of this study, we investigate how the resignation of top managers in French companies is received by the market. To summarise, we expect (i) an immediate positive price increase at the announcement of forced dismissals, (ii) a negative price change coinciding with non-conflictual resignations and with CEO departures due to illness or decease and (iii) no market reaction at age-related retirements. CEO departure usually coincides with the nomination of a new CEO and the choice between internal and external succession may depend on corporate characteristics such as corporate size, sector homogeneity and past corporate performance. We investigate whether these characteristics have a bearing on relations (i) to (iii). In section 2, the sample selection is described and the data sources and variables are disclosed. Section 3 discusses the results of the event studies.
In section 4, we also investigate whether top management turnover is related to ownership and debt structure and internal corporate control mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Methodology.

Sample selection and description of data sources and of variables.
The sample In this press search, the following information was collected: the reasons given for the CEO departure, the controlling mechanism that intervened to remove a top manager and the number of directors departing along with the CEO. In addition to the announcement date of the resignation, other market sensitive information released close to the same date was also collected to disentangle the pure informational effect of the resignation.
Distinguishing among forced and non-conflictual resignations is difficult as euphemistic terms are often used to mask the dismissal or no reasons are given. We consider as forced resignations those cases where the CEO departure resulted from the non-renewal of the CEOs mandate as a director and from the formal CEO dismissal as reported in the database of the
Banque de France (BdF). This information was supplemented with data from Les Echos:
although some resignations are classified as voluntary in the BdF-database, they were considered as forced if a press article alluded to a conflict (e.g. departure following a change in control, conflict with shareholders or the board of directors or another member of the management team, difference in strategic views, etc.). The sample of non-conflictual resignations includes departures where the CEO has taken the initiative and for which there are no press articles suggesting a conflict. This category of non-conflictual resignations may also include departures due to illness or decease. Hence, we are relatively certain that the subsample of forced turnover consists of turnover due to conflicts. However, the sample with non-conflictual turnover which consists of voluntary resignations, may also contain some case of forced turnover due to poor or uninformative disclosure of the reasons for CEO departure. A third category of CEO departures consists of age-related retirements. Data on new corporate destinations of leaving directors and on the professional origins of nominated directors were collected from the guide Who's Who. This source allows us to distinguish between internal and external promotions to the board. We consider an external nomination to have taken place when an outsider was nominated to the board less than one year prior to his or her promotion to CEO.
In the annual reports of 207 French companies over the period 1988-92, 277 CEO resignations were identified. In 38% of these CEO departures, part of the management team left the firm along with the CEO. Table 1 shows that the BdF database reports 242 CEO changes whereas the financial press (the financial paper Les Echos) only reports 128 cases.
17% of the CEO turnover was age-related retirement and 7% of the resignations were caused by death or illness. Conflicts with the board of directors, the shareholders or other members of the management committee resulted in forced turnover in 10% of all the CEO departures, whereas in 20% there was no sign of conflict with 13% of the CEOs invoking personal reasons and 7% leaving to pursue other professional opportunities. Still, such voluntary resignations may still have been the consequence of undisclosed managerial disciplining. Table 1 also exhibits the differences in classifying the reasons of resignation between the BdF and the financial press. In 45% of the CEO departures mentioned in the financial press no reason for departure was given and the cases classified as 'dismissals' in the BdF database appeared to be a category in which departures for a variety of reasons were amalgamated.
Consequently, only 92 CEO departures could be classified with almost complete certainty into one of the following categories (table 2) : forced turnover (37 cases), non-conflictual resignations (34 cases) and age-related retirements (21 cases). It is these cases which are included in the event studies. It is these 92 cases which will be used in the event study analysis of sections 3.1 and 3.2 and the share price reaction model of section 3.3. In the CEO disciplining logit model of section 4, all data are included; if no reason is provided in the financial press or BdF database the turnover is assumed to be conflictual.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Company characteristics such as industrial sector, ownership structure, capital structure, market capitalisation, number of employees, accounting data, were collected from the DAFSA fiches . Share price and dividend pay-out data were collected from the database FININFO which contains the daily closing prices for the French market indices CAC40 and SBF, for the sector indices and for all listed companies for the period 1988-92.
The interest rate on short term government bonds is used as a proxy for the riskfree rate and collected from the Statistiques Annuelles de la Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF).
Corporate size was measured by market capitalisation, total sales, total assets and total number of employees. 6 The following performance measures prior to the board turnover were chosen: ROE (on market and book value basis), market adjusted returns, Marris ratio,
Treynor ratio, Tobin's Q for the year of turnover and one and two years prior. In addition, these performance variables were corrected for industry effects by taking the deviation from the industry averages.
Companies are considered to be sector-homogeneous when their markets, technologies and 2.2 Methodology.
Abnormal return calculation and event studies.
In order to measure the abnormal return of share i at day t, the market and risk adjusted return is calculated which assumes that a version of the CAPM generates expected returns. For example, the Treynor-Sharpe-Lintner model, E (R i,t 
)= E(R F,t )+β i [E(R m,t )-E(R F,t )], generates a
return for every share i with R F,t being the return of a risk free asset and R m,t being the return 6 In the regressions, the logarithm of the consolidated data is included.
of the market portfolio. The abnormal return AR i,t is the difference between the (logarithmic) nominal return and the expected return, R i,t -E(R i,t ). Betas were estimated with daily returns over a period of 260 to 60 days prior to the announcement day 0. As the companies in our sample are liquid companies listed on the 'first market', a correction for thin trading was deemed not necessary.
To test whether the equally weighted arithmetic average of the abnormal returns ( abnormal returns in the cross section of shares are from independent and identically distributed samples from a distribution with finite variance, the central limit theorem shows number of shares increases. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) show that, for small samples of 5 or 10 shares, the distribution of abnormal returns deviates from the normal distribution, but the non-normality of daily returns does not have a significant impact on the event study methodology.
Price reaction regression models.
In order to explain the market price reaction at the announcement the voluntary or forced CEO turnover (measured by a 2-day abnormal return around the announcement day), the regression model presented in table 2 is estimated. The cases of turnover for which no unambiguous reason could be determined were excluded. The explanatory variables are corporate performance, size, sector homogeneity of the firm, a dummy variable indicating internal succession (a CEO promoted from the pool of managers of the firm) or external succession (CEO is recruited externally), and a dummy variable reflecting the type of resignation (forced versus voluntary departure). Table 1 also shows the reduced regression models for the specific combinations of forced/voluntary turnover with internal/external succession. For example, the degree to which the price reaction depends on past corporate performance and on the fact that the CEO was forced to resign while an external candidate was nominated, can be computed by summing up the parameter estimates β i2 , β i6 and β i8 . The coefficient β i2 by itself reflects the relation between the market price reaction and past performance when the CEO leaves voluntary and is succeeded by an internal CEO.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Disciplining of top management.
Logit regressions with panel data over the period 1988-92 whereby every year represents an individual observation are estimated to determine whether or not conflictual CEO turnover (dummy=1) is initiated by concentrated ownership or another monitoring mechanism. Industry and time specific fixed effects models are estimated with the executive board turnover as an independent variable. With regard to ownership concentration, a distinction is made among holding companies, institutions, industrial companies, government controlled investment agencies, and individuals and families. Variables capturing past corporate performance, the degree of leverage and board characteristics such as board size, the percentage of nonexecutives, the separation of CEO and chairman, the percentage of directors representing shareholders, debtholders and founders are also included. The robustness of the models is tested by including corporate dummies and by including taking innovations to remove firm-specific effects. In order to address the endogeneity problems lagged data for ownership, performance and debt policy were included in the models.
The relation between board restructuring, performance, ownership, leverage, board structure is -SIZE = logarithm of total assets or of total employees.
-Leg.form. = Legal Form : Dummy is 0 if company is a Société Anonyme, is 1 if company is a Société Anonyme à Directoire, is 2 if company is a Société à Commandite par Actions.
-Stock Exch. = Type of stock exchange: dummy =0 if share is listed on the reglement mensuel (most liquid market) and 0 if listed on the cash market (CPT) 3. Market reactions to changes in top management.
Share price movements at announcement of CEO resignations: event study results.
Of all the CEOs who relinquished their functions, the destination of 124 could be traced: 48 moved to another firm, whereas 61 remained employed by the same company or became nonexecutive directors and 15 joined a firm belonging to the same corporate group. 98% of the announcements of CEO departures included the nomination of a successor. Contrary to the recommendations of good corporate governance in most countries, the functions of CEO and
Chairman of the board are not separated in 84% of our sample. reaction between announcements of non-conflictual and forced turnover: the market reacts significantly and positively to forced turnover in comparison with the announcement of nonconflictual departure. Surprisingly, the announcement of an age-related retirement triggers a negative price reaction (panel C), which contradicts proposal 3. In table 3, the market price reaction takes place not on the announcement date itself but over a period of 20 days around day 0. This may result from the fact that in the case of conflicts or poor performance, the market may have anticipated a resignation, which can also be observed in figure 1 where the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) drift upwards in the period prior to the announcement.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Share price movements at CEO succession announcement of: event study results.
Market reactions to changes in CEO and to internal or external promotions are expected to depend on past corporate performance. External CEO succession triggers stronger positive price reactions than internal succession if the renouncing management's performance, reflected in past corporate performance, was unsatisfactory (proposition 5a). If, on the contrary, past corporate performance was sound, internal promotion may create a less negative price reaction as the loss of company-specific human capital at the departure of the CEO is less (proposition 5b). In figure 2a , the wealth effect of the nomination of an external CEO is depicted for poorly performing companies 7 : while none of the abnormal returns prior to the announcement dates are statistically significant, the CAAR increases at the announcement by more than 2% to 2.86%. Figure 2b shows that in poorly performing companies with internal CEO succession, the CAAR is negative up to 10 days prior to the announcement, then becomes positive, but drops by almost 1% on the day of the announcement. All abnormal returns are not statistically significant apart from the price decline on the announcement day. These findings corroborate proposition 5a: in poorly performing companies, the nomination of an external CEO is greeted by the markets with a price increase. However, in poorly performing companies with an internal CEO promotion, the CAAR rises prior to the announcement presumably in anticipation to the removal of the incumbent CEO who is held responsible for the corporate performance. The market reacts negatively when an internal manager is promoted as this manager may be held partially responsible for past poor performance
In companies with good past performance and with internal succession, there is a price decline from day -5 to +4, but this is not statistically significant (figure 2b). External succession in companies with a good performance track record, share prices decline significantly from day -12 and after the announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns levels off (figure 2a). It should be noted that the number of events is small, but that these 7 An promotion is defined as being external if the new CEO was neither employed by the company nor serves on the firm's board of directors at least one year prior to the promotion. Good and poor performance is defined as, respectively, above and below the median of the return on equity (ROE) corrected for the average industry ROE and taken over the year prior to the turnover. The findings are robust to the other definitions of performance described in section 2.
findings are not incongruent with proposal 5b which states that turnover in well performing companies induces a loss of human capital which is stronger when the new CEO is external to the company. If the company is diversified and operates in several unrelated industries, the value of the human capital of a new top manager can be assessed with less precision than in undiversified companies. Hence, external succession may trigger a higher positive price reaction 8 in a diversified company as the value added by an external manager may be higher than in nondiversified firms. Proposal 7 is not supported by our evidence.
[INSERT FIGURES 2A AND 2B, 3A AND 3B ABOUT HERE]
3.3. Share price reaction model. Table 4 shows the relation between the cumulative annual average abnormal return in a 20-day event window at the announcement of CEO departure, and corporate size, past performance (industry corrected Return on Equity), degree of corporate diversification, type of CEO resignation (forced or voluntary) and origin of the CEO successor (internal or external). The explanatory variables in this cross-sectional regression explain a large proportion (48.6%) of the total variation in share price reactions. Past performance, forced departure and the interaction terms of performance and background of the new CEO (internal or external nomination) are statistically significant (within the 5% level).
In the case of a forced resignation by the incumbent CEO (resignation dummy=1) and of poor past performance (e.g. industry-corrected ROE of -10%), a positive price reaction of 2.9% is expected since the negative performance effect of -1.4% (β i2 ) is more than compensated by the positive effect of the forced turnover with 4.3% (β i5 ). Hence, this evidence supports proposition 1 which states that a positive price reaction is expected when the CEO is forced to leave when performance was poor. The positive price reaction increases by a further 1% 9 (β i8 )
at the announcement of an external successor (succession dummy=1), which supports proposition 5a. When the CEO resigns voluntary (resignation dummy=0), is succeeded by an internal manager (succession dummy=0) and industry-corrected past return on equity was positive (e.g. 10%), a positive price reaction of 13.7% is obtained. This does not corroborate proposition 2. However, this positive price reaction is sharply adjusted downwards to 3.7% if In table 6, we investigate whether conflictual CEO removal resulting from poor corporate performance is caused by large shareholder activism or is facilitated by an efficient board structure. Past performance is measured both by lagged market corrected share price performance, Tobin's Q, levels and changes of return on equity (earnings after tax) and levels and changes of return on assets (operating earnings). Although there is strong evidence of performance-related top management disciplining in the US (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991) , UK (Franks et al. 1998) , Japan (Kaplan and Minton 1994) and Belgium , there seems to be no consistent relation for the sample of French companies between past performance and forced CEO departures. Neither the performance terms shown in table 6 nor the interaction terms between performance and the disciplinary mechanisms (not shown) are statistically significant.
As ownership is strongly concentrated in France with the largest shareholder controlling a majority in the average company, board restructuring is expected to be initiated by this shareholder (such as holding companies, industrial companies). However, executive directors owning major share stakes may impede board restructuring. Institutional investors (banks, pension/investment funds, insurance companies) are not expected to monitor if they intend to safeguard portfolio liquidity and to avoid transgressing the insider trading regulation.
Proposition 8 is upheld by the findings of table 6. The presence of a holding company in the ownership structure is positively correlated with the probability of a forced CEO resignation.
However, it is questionable whether the large holding companies do discipline poorly performing CEOs because the interaction terms of performance and ownership by holding companies is not statistically significant. Thus, in the wake of poor performance, holding companies do not seem to be instrumental in removing the incumbent CEO. Banerjee et al. (1997) and found no evidence was found for respectively French and
Belgian holding companies of wealth creation. are undertaken by ultimate shareholders rather than by the owners at the direct level. Table 6 also shows that banks or institutions do not partake in managerial disciplining. Furthermore, although many companies are (indirectly) controlled by the government, there is not evidence of performance-related corporate governance actions in these companies.
All in all, the relation between ownership concentration and disciplining is, at best, weak. The reason may be that much of shareholder monitoring and corporate governance actions is undertaken by shareholder representatives on the board of directors. To capture the board characteristics, the percentage of non-executive directors on the board is included as well as the percentage of directors representing the large shareholders, creditors and founding family.
In line with in US and Belgian findings (Weisbach 1988 but in contrast to UK findings (Faccio and Lasfer 1999, Franks et al. 1998), table 6 shows that the higher the percentage of independent directors, the higher the probability of forced CEO turnover. There is also strong evidence that in companies with a high percentage of the non-executive directors representing the shareholders a higher probability forced CEO is to be expected.
Still, less forced CEO turnover is taking place when the board also comprises directors representing the founding family. This may result from the fact that these founding families are trying to defend the private benefits they derive from their (executive) positions on the board. 10 No relation was discovered between capital gearing and forced turnover, although a creditor's influence may be captured by the percentage of directors representing shareholders which is strongly correlated with forced CEO departure. Finally, there is evidence that forced CEO turnover occurs more frequently in smaller companies.
[ INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE]
Conclusions.
This study has analysed the share price reactions to changes in top management. proportion of shareholder representatives on the board leads to a higher probability of forced CEO resignations. However, this probability decreases when the founding family is represented by one or more (executive) directors.
whether a founder representative is executive or non-executive director. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in both regressions indicates that the normality hypothesis of the residuals cannot be rejected: the significance tests are valid Notes: RESIGN = resignation: equals 1 in case of forced resignation and 0 in case of voluntary resignation. Age-related retirements are excluded from the sample. ORIGIN = origin of the successor: equals 1 if the new CEO is external (was not previously employed by the firm or was employed for maximally 1 year) or 0 if the CEO is internal. SIZE = corporate size measured by the logarithm of the market capitalisation. PERFORM = performance measured by the change in ROE corrected for industry ROE in the year prior to the CEO substitution. HOM = sector homogeneity of the firm measured by the correlation between the share price return of the firm and the return of the industrial sector. ***, ** and * stand for the significance at respectively 1%, 5% and 10%. 
